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* The views expressed in this article are those only of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York, where the
author is employed. 
1. “Pro se” is a Latin term meaning “[f]or oneself” or “on one’s own
behalf.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (7th ed. 1999).  When used
in a legal setting, the term means acting “without a lawyer.”
Similar Latin terms include “pro persona” and “in propria per-
sona.”
2. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“less strin-
gent standards”); Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (“spe-
cial solicitude”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.
1992) (“great leniency”).
3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Abdulwadud Abbas, No. H028443,
2006 WL 788900, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App., March 29, 2006); Barrett
v. City of Margate, 743 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999); Myers v. Estate of Wilks, 655 A.2d 176, 177-178 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995); Barnes v. Texas, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992); Du-Art Film Labs., Inc. v. Wharton Int’l Films, Inc.,
457 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61-62 (N.Y. App. Div., 1982). 
4. See, e.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005);
Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 927, 928 n.2 (4th Cir. 1977);
Merriweather v. Zamora, 04-CV-717076, 2005 WL 2448946, at *1
n.1 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2005); Fiore v. City of N.Y., 97-CV-4935,
1998 WL 755134, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1998); Coleman v.
Runyon, 93-CV-0016, 1996 WL 528855, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Pa. March
11, 1996).
6. See, e.g., Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2006); U.S.
v. Arnold, 114 F. App’x 76, 78 (11th Cir. 2005); Melencio Legui
Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 933-934 (9th Cir. 2000); Whitford v.
Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 535 n.10 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. AMX, Int’l,
7 F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1993).
7. See, e.g., Smith v. McMichael, 153 F. App’x 566, 568-69 (11th Cir.
2005); Wilson v. Weisner, 43 F. App’x 982, 986 n.1 (7th Cir.
2002); Connor v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992),
vacated on other grounds, 61 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 1995); Williams v.
Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974).
8. See, e.g., U.S. v. Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S. v.
Willis, 804 F.2d 961, 963 (6th Cir. 1986); Yates v. Mobile County
Pers. Bd., 658 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir. 1980); see also 8A Moore’s
Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 37.04[2] (2d ed. 1986) [collecting cases].
9. See, e.g., Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1998);
Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987); Donhauser v.
Goord, 314 F. Supp. 2d 119, 212 (N.D.N.Y.), vacated on other
grounds, 317 F. Supp. 2d 160 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
10. See, e.g., Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Gomez v.
USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999); Davidson
v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1994).
11. “The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit
Courts of Appeals mandate that notice of summary judgment
requirements be given to pro se litigants.”  Jessica Case, Pro Se
Litigants at the Summary Judgment Stage: Is Ignorance of the Law an
Excuse? 90 KY. L.J. 701, 704 n.24 (Spring 2001) [citations omit-
ted].  “The Ninth Circuit requires notice of summary judgment
requirements for pro se prisoner litigants only.”  Id.
12. See, e.g., LeSane v. Hall’s Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d
Cir. 2001); Habib v. GMC, 15 F.3d 72, 74 (6th Cir. 1994); Sule v.
Gregg, No. 92-36888, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17169, at *3 (9th Cir.
July 7, 1993); Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984);
Jackson v. Nicoletti, 875 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 & n.6 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
Since the early 1990s, federal courts in the Second andThird Circuits have, with increasing frequency, revokedthe special status of pro se civil litigants who have been
overly litigious.  This article discusses the reasons for this
trend’s appearance in the Second and Third Circuits, the ratio-
nales for the trend, the fairness of the trend, and some practi-
cal advice for courts and practitioners wrestling with the issue
of whether or not the special status of a particularly litigious
pro se litigant should be revoked.
I. NATURE OF SPECIAL STATUS AND TREND
As a general rule, every federal court in the United States
affords “pro se”1 civil litigants special status, although courts
often differ on the way they describe that status.2 This general
rule is followed, to varying degrees, by state courts.3
Uniformly, this special status consists of a right to have one’s
pleadings construed more liberally than those of a represented
litigant.4 For example, this liberal construction might result in
a court recognizing a pro se plaintiff’s complaint as alleging a
fact or claim, even if the complaint makes no express mention
of such a fact or claim.5 However, a pro se litigant’s pleadings
are not the only documents that are routinely afforded a liberal
reading.  Also liberally construed are a pro se litigant’s briefs,6
affidavits,7 and notices of appeal.8
Moreover, depending on the court, this special status may
confer a variety of other benefits on pro se litigants: (1) a right
to have one’s complaint treated as amended by one’s papers in
opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim;9 (2) a right to file an amended complaint,
including a second amended complaint;10 (3) a right to be
specifically notified of the consequences of failing to respond
to a summary judgment motion before being subjected to
those consequences;11 (4) a right to be excused from comply-
ing with service deadlines, discovery deadlines, motion-filing
deadlines, and page limits;12 and (5) a right to be presumed to
have been acting in good faith when sanctions are being con-
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13. See, e.g., Maduakolam v. Columbia Univ., 866 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir.
1989); see also Brian L. Holtzclaw, Pro Se Litigants: Application of a
Single Objective Standard Under FRCP 11 to Reduce Frivolous
Litigation, 16 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1371, 1373-1375 & n.15-16
(Spring 1993) [citing cases].
14. See, e.g., Korsunskiy v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir.
2006); Int’l Bus. Prop. v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 65 F.3d 175, at *2
(9th Cir. 1995); Flynn, 32 F.3d at 31; Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 781
F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827
(10th Cir. 1979); Zaczek v. Fauquier County, 764 F. Supp. 1071,
1078 (E.D. Va. 1991); Life Science Church v. U.S., 607 F. Supp.
1037, 1039 (N.D. Oh. 1985); see also John C. Rothermich, Ethical
and Procedural Implications of “Ghostwriting” for Pro Se Litigants:
Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2687,
2697 (Apr. 1999) [citing cases].
15. See, e.g., Day v. Allstate Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 1110, 1111-1113 (5th
Cir. 1986); In re Martin-Trigona, 763 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1985);
McCutcheon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 88-CV-9965, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8141, at *2, 24 & n.3-6 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 1989); Williams
v. Giant Supermkt. Store, 88-CV-2434, 1989 WL 10600, at *1
(D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1989); Castro v. U.S., 584 F. Supp. 252, 264 (D.
Puerto Rico 1984); Welsh v. Steinmetz, 84-CV-1846, 1984 WL
13132, at *5 (D.N.M. Dec. 20, 1984); Hosley v. Bass, 519 F. Supp.
395, 407 n.27 (D. Md. 1981); Raitport v. Chem. Bank, 74 F.R.D.
128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
16. See, e.g., Colo. v. Dunlop, 623 P.2d 408, 410-411 (Colo. 1981);
Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 412-413 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989);
Kondrat v. Byron, 579 N.E.2d 287, 288-289 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989);
Mullen v. Renner, 685 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Bardacke v. Welsh, 698 P.2d 462, 466-471 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985);
Hunnewell v. Hunnewell, 445 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (Mass. App. Ct.
1983); Muka v. Hancock, Estabrook, Ryan, Shove & Hust, 465
N.Y.S.2d 416, 416-417 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Hotel Martha Wash.
Mgmt. Co. v. Swinick, 324 N.Y.S.2d 687, 694 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971). 
17. Second Circuit: See, e.g., Iwachiw v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Motor Veh.,
396 F.3d 525, 529 (2d Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Eggersdorf, 8 F.
App’x 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’g, 97-CV-0938, Decision and
Order (N.D.N.Y. May 28, 1999); Johnson v. Gummerson, 201 F.3d
431, at *2 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’g, 97-CV-1727, Decision and Order
(N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1999); Flynn, 32 F.3d at 31; Edwards v. Selsky,
04-CV-1054, 2007 WL 748442, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. March 6, 2007);
Rolle v. Garcia, 04-CV-0312, 2007 WL 672679, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2007); Mora v. Bockelmann, 03-CV-1217, 2007 WL
603410, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2007); Brown v. Goord, 04-CV-
0785, 2007 WL 607396, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007);
Mitchell v. Harriman, 04-CV-0937, 2007 WL 499619, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007); Sledge v. Kooi, 04-CV-1311, 2007 WL
951447, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2007); Gill v. Pidylpchak, 02-
CV-1460, 2006 WL 3751340, at *2 n.3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2006); Saunders v. Ricks, 03-CV-0598, 2006 WL 3051792, at *2
& n.11 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2006); Tibbetts v. Stempel, 97-CV-
2561, 2005 WL 2146079, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2005); Gill v.
Frawley, 02-CV-1380, 2006 WL 1742738, at *3 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y.
June 22, 2006); Davidson v. Talbot, 01-CV-0473, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39576, at *18-20 & n.10 (N.D.N.Y. March 31, 2005); Gill
v. Riddick, 03-CV-1456, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5394, at *7 & n.3
(N.D.N.Y. March 31, 2005); Yip v. SUNY, 03-CV-0959, 2004 WL
2202594, at *3-4 & n.7, 10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2004); Davidson
v. Dean, 204 F.R.D. 251, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Santiago v. Campisi,
91 F. Supp. 2d 665, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); McGann v. U.S., 98-CV-
2192, 1999 WL 173596, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 1999); Jones v.
City of Buffalo, 96-CV-0379, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6070, at *16-
19 & n.7-8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1998); Brown v. McClellan, 93-CV-
0901, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8164, at *3-4 & n.3 (W.D.N.Y. June
10, 1996); Brown v. Selsky, 93-CV-0268, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
213, at *2 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1995); Baasch v. Reyer, 827 F.
Supp. 940, 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Kissel v. DiMartino, 92-CV-5660,
1993 WL 289430, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 1993); Hussein v. Pitta,
88-CV-2549, 1991 WL 221033, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1991).
Third Circuit: See, e.g., Tilbury v. AAmes Home Loan, 05-
CV-2033, 2005 WL 3477558, at *1-5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2005);
Hollis-Arrington v. PHH Mort. Corp., 05-CV-2556, 2005 WL
3077853, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2005); Perry v. Gold & Laine,
P.C., 371 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629 (D.N.J. 2005); Smith v. Litton Loan
Serv., LP, 04-CV-2846, 2005 WL 289927, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4,
2005); Douris v. Bucks County, 04-CV-0232, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1279, at *14-15, 40-41 & n. 19 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2005);
Weber v. Henderson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 616, 618, 622 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Frempong-Atuahene v. City of Phila., 99-CV-4386, 2000
WL 233216, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2000); Frempong-Atuahene
v. Transam. Fin. Consum. Disc. Co., 99-CV-0965, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 324, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2000); Frempong-Atuahene
v. Redev. Auth. of City of Phila., 99-CV-0704, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 113, at *2, 4, 8-9 & n.1-2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2000), aff’d,
250 F.3d 755 (3d Cir. 2001); Armstrong v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 99-
CV-0825, 1999 WL 773507, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. La Trattoria East, Inc., 95-CV-1784, 1995 WL
552881, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1995); Wexler v. Citibank, 94-
CV-4172, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14992, at *19-20 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
21, 1994); Hollawell v. Leman, 94-CV-5730, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14139, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1994); Lyden v. Susser,
93-CV-3949, 1994 WL 117794, at *8 (D.N.J. March 30, 1994);
Kupersmit v. Nat’l Mort., 91-CV-4049, 1992 WL 108967, at *1
(E.D. Pa. May 12, 1992).
18. State Courts: See, e.g., Martin v. D.C. Ct. of App., 506 U.S. 1, 2-
3 (1992); Hamilton v. Fla., 945 So.2d 1121, 1122-1124 (Fla.
2006); Karr v. Williams, 50 P.3d 910, 913-916 (Colo. 2002);
Corley v. U.S., 741 A.2d 1029, 1029-1031 (D.C. 1999); Matter of
Burns, 542 N.W.2d 389, 389-390 (Minn. 1996); Turner-El v. West,
811 N.E.2d 728, 733-736 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Vinson v. Benson,
805 So.2d 571, 573, 576-577 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); Kan. v. Lynn,
975 P.2d 813, 815-816 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); Thomas v. Sibbett,
925 P.2d 1286, 1286-1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Mullen v.
GMAC, 919 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Sud v. Sud, 642
N.Y.S.2d 893, 893-894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Cain v. Buehner, 839
S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Cronen v. County Storage
Lot, 831 S.W.2d 895, 898-899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Lepiscopo v.
Hopwood, 791 P.2d 481, 483 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); Melnitzky v.
templated.13 The rationale for conferring this special status is
that pro se litigants need help since they are often inexperi-
enced or unfamiliar with legal procedures or terminology.14
Historically, federal courts across the United States have
been willing, on occasion, to diminish or look past this special
status when pro se litigants abuse the litigation process.15 This
willingness has been shared by many state courts.16 Moreover,
since the early 1990s, federal courts in the Second and Third
Circuits have, with increasing frequency, revoked the special
status of pro se civil litigants who have been overly litigious.17
While courts outside the Second and Third Circuits have also,
during this time period, diminished or looked past the special
status of such pro se civil litigants, they have done so less fre-
quently.18
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Uribe, 806 N.Y.S.2d 446, *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Spremo v.
Babchik, 589 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1023-1024 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
Federal Courts: See, e.g., Adams v. Nankervis, No. 89-35511,
1990 WL 61990, at *2 (9th Cir. May 10, 1990); Greathouse v. City
of Plymouth, Ohio, 06-CV-2014, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79770, at
*4-5, 16-19 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2006); Williams v. Smith, 05-CV-
0845, 2006 WL 2192470, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2006);
Whitfield v. Walker, 04-CV-3136, 2006 WL 618893, at *3 (C.D.
Ill. March 10, 2006); Vongrabe v. Sprint PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d
1313, 1319-1321 (S.D. Cal. 2004); Jiricko v. Moser and Marsalek,
P.C., 184 F.R.D. 611, 615 (E.D. Mo. 1999); U.S. v. Barker, 19 F.
Supp. 2d 1380, 1382, 1385 & n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1998); Cok v. Forte,
877 F. Supp. 797, 804 (D.R.I. 1994).  It is worth noting that ten
such decisions come from within the Tenth Circuit.  See Jenkins
v. MTGLQ Inv., No. 05-4057, 2007 WL 431498, at *4-5 (10th Cir.
Feb. 9, 2007); Garrett v. Selby, 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005);
Judd v. Univ. of New Mexico, 204 F.3d 1041, 1044 (10th Cir.
2000); Washington v. Dorsey, No. 95-2081, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
17080, at *5 (10th Cir. July 13, 1995); DePineda v. Hemphill, 34
F.3d 946, 948 (10th Cir. 1994); Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446,
1449 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Winslow, 17 F.3d 314, 315 (10th Cir.
1994); Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992); Lynn
v. Roberts, 01-CV-3422, 2006 WL 2850273, at *3-5 (D. Kan. Oct.
4, 2006); Nutter v. Wefald, 90-CV-1436, 1997 WL 833298, at *1
(D. Kan. 1997); Housley v. Burrows, 97-CV-1532, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23049, at *12-13 (W.D. Ok. Oct. 28, 1997).  However, gen-
erally, the link between the special status of the pro se litigants and
the remedial or punitive action taken by the court in those cases
is less direct than is that link in the cases from within the Second
and Third Circuits.
19. This phenomenon has been well documented by systematic stud-
ies, and confirmed by the reports of judges and court managers.
See, e.g., Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se
Phenomenon, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L LAW 103, 112 (Fall 2002);
Case, supra note 11, at 701-702 & n.2, 11, 12; Jona Goldschmidt,
The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the
Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 36 (Jan.
2002); Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Table 2.4: U.S. Court of
Appeals (Excludes Federal Circuit): Pro Se Cases Filed
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/Table204.pdf (last
visited on Jan. 3, 2007).    
20. See Goldschmidt, supra note 19, at 36.
21. These figures come from a chart on file with the author.  The chart
was prepared by the author, using data obtained by running sim-
ple searches in the relevant LexisNexis files, for example, “coun-
sel (pro se) and date(geq (01/01/1990) and leq (12/31/1990))” in
the LexisNexis “1st” file.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. These figures come from a chart on file with the author.  The chart
was prepared by the author, using data obtained from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, specifically, (1) Table S-
24: Civil Pro Se and Non-Pro Se Filings, by District, During the 12-
Month Period Ending September 30, 2005 http://www.
uscourts.gov/judbus2005/tables/s24.pdf (last visited on Jan. 3,
2007), and (2) Table 4.2: U.S. District Courts: Civil Cases Filed by
District http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/Table402.pdf
(last visited on Jan. 3, 2007).
25. See supra note 21.
26. See supra note 21.  The number of judges per circuit was deter-
mined by adding the number of district judges per circuit, as listed
in title 28, section 133 of the United States Code, to the number
of circuit judges per circuit, as listed in title 28, section 44 of the
United States Code.
27. Id.; see also supra note 18 (not listing any cases from Fourth or
Fifth Circuits).
II. REASONS FOR TREND’S APPEARANCE IN SECOND
AND THIRD CIRCUITS
What is different about the Second and Third Circuits that
has caused the trend to appear there first?  Is it that those two
circuits have more pro se litigation than do other federal cir-
cuits?  The answer appears to be no.  
It is beyond cavil that, over the past two decades, it has
become more common for parties to litigate pro se in federal
and state court.19 As one commentator has observed, causes for
this trend include “increased literacy, consumerism, a sense of
rugged individualism, the costs of litigation and attorneys’ fees,
antilawyer sentiment, and the breakdown of family and reli-
gious institutions that formerly resolved many disputes that are
now presented to courts instead.”20 However, it does not appear
that the rise in pro se litigation in the Second and Third Circuits
has been any greater than the average rise in such litigation in
other circuits.  For example, between 1990 and 2005, the
Second Circuit experienced a 5.9-fold increase in the number of
reported decisions involving pro se litigants, while the Third
Circuit experienced a 5.7-fold increase in the number of such
decisions.21 However, 6 of the 13 other federal circuits (count-
ing the D.C. Circuit and Federal Circuit) experienced a greater
increase in the number of such decisions.22 Indeed, the rate of
increase of such decisions in the Second Circuit and Third
Circuits was below the national average rate of increase (a 14.5-
fold increase) of such decisions.23
Nor does it appear that, in the Second and Third circuits,
pro se cases comprise an unusually large percentage of all
civil cases filed there.  Based on an analysis of the number of
civil pro se cases filed and the total number of civil cases filed
by circuit (excluding the Federal Circuit) during the twelve-
month period ending September 30, 2004, it appears that the
Second and Third Circuits were in ninth and twelfth place
(respectively).24
Nor does there appear to be an unusually high ratio of
pro se cases per judge in the Second and Third Circuits.
Among all 13 federal circuits, the Second and Third Circuits
issued the fifth and fourth most reported decisions (respec-
tively) involving pro se litigants in 2005.25 Taking into
account the number of authorized federal judgeships in
each of those circuits, the Second and Third Circuits remain
in fifth and fourth place (respectively) in terms of the num-
ber of such decisions issued per judge in 2005.26 If the ratio
of pro se cases per judge were the reason for the trend’s
appearance in the Second and Third Circuits, then how
would one explain the fact that the trend does not appear to
be occurring in the two circuits with the most such deci-
sions issued per judge in 2005, namely, the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits?27
Is it that the Second and Third Circuits have experienced
a rise in the number of prisoners incarcerated there, coupled
with the fact that prisoners file most of the pro se cases in fed-
14 Court Review 
28. See Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Table S-24: Civil Pro Se and Non-
Pro Se Filings, by District, During the 12-Month Period Ending
September 30, 2005 http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/tables/
s24.pdf (last visited on Jan. 3, 2007); Jonathan D. Rosenbloom,
Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se
Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New
York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 314 & n.40 (Nov. 2002).
29. See supra note 17 (citing cases).
30. George Hill and Paige Harrison, Prisoners Under State or Federal
Jurisdiction: 1977-2004; United States Department of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics (Dec. 6, 2005) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/data/corpop02.csv (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
31. Id.
32. See supra note 17; see also Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, Institutional Map http://www.cor.state.pa.us/portal/
cwp/view.asp?a=376&q=126815&portalNav=| (last visited Dec.
28, 2006).
33. See Hollawell, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14139.
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eral court?28 Again, the answer appears to be no.  The three
states whose federal courts have issued the most status-revok-
ing decisions from within the Second and Third Circuits since
1990 are New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.29 However,
between 1977 and 2004, the prison populations in New York
and New Jersey grew about as fast as the average prison popu-
lation nationally.30 Granted, the prison population in
Pennsylvania grew slightly faster than did the average prison
population nationally.31 However, of the 15 status-revoking
decisions found from courts in the Third Circuit, 11 of those
decisions were issued by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
which does not contain as many prisons as do the Middle or
Western Districts of Pennsylvania.32 More important, only one
of those 15 decisions involved a pro se inmate.33
What, then, is the reason for the trend’s appearance in the
Second and Third Circuits?  In analyzing the 15 status-revok-
ing decisions from courts in the Third Circuit, it becomes clear
that seven of those decisions were in actions involving mort-
gages.34 While only four of these decisions came from the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the other three coming from
the District of New Jersey),35 those decisions are consistent
with news articles reporting a surge in the number of borrow-
ers alleging predatory practices by certain lenders in the
greater Philadelphia area in the past decade.36 The cases are
also consistent with news reports of a shortage of pro bono
lawyers able to represent such borrowers.37 As a result, one of
the reasons for the trend’s occurrence in the Third Circuit
appears to have been district courts’ frustration with a handful
of particularly abusive pro se litigants who were complaining
about lending practices in the greater Philadelphia area.
As for the Second Circuit, while an analysis of prisoner-pop-
ulation growth may not explain the trend’s appearance in that
circuit, a further analysis of prisoner litigation in general in
that circuit might offer some explanation for the trend’s
appearance there.  This is because, of the 27 status-revoking
decisions that were issued from courts in the Second Circuit
since 1990, 18 of those decisions involved pro se prisoners
suing for alleged civil-rights violations.38 But is prisoner liti-
gation in the Second Circuit somehow different from prisoner
litigation in other circuits, and if so, why?  
It appears that the answer to this question is yes in the sense
that, together, the New York State Department of Correctional
Services (DOCS) and the federal district courts located in New
York State appear to foster the creation of experienced pro se
prisoner litigants.  This conclusion is based on four pieces of
evidence.  First, all 18 of the aforementioned status-revoking
decisions were issued by federal district courts located in New
York State and involved pro se New York State prisoners.
Second, the New York State DOCS maintains prison law
libraries of a relatively high quality as compared to many other
state prison law libraries.  “Nearly $2.5 million was spent in
Fiscal [Year] 2005-06 [alone] to maintain all the [state correc-
tional facility] law libraries [in New York State], including the
updates of the law book and periodical collections, and also
the supply of pens, paper and photocopying materials.”39 Such
expenditures are in stark contrast to the cuts in funding of
prison law libraries by other states (such as Arizona,
California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, New Mexico, and
Washington).40 The result of such expenditures by New York
State is a network of 93 law libraries that appears to generally
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REPRESENTED DIVORCE LITIGANT, at 24-25 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1994);
FED. R. APP. P. 45(a).
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Court for the N.D.N.Y., PRO SE HANDBOOK ttp://www.nynd.
uscourts.gov/documents/Prosehandbook.pdf (last visited Dec. 29,
2006).  The Western District’s manual is 45 pages long.  U.S.
District Court for the W.D.N.Y., THE PRO SE LITIGATION GUIDELINES
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(last visited Dec. 29, 2006).
50. See U.S. District Court for the E.D.N.Y., Court Forms: Pro Se Forms
http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/General_Information/Court_Form
s/courts_forms.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2006).
51. See Hon. Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts,
Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 N.D. J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 475, 493, 495 (2002).
52. See Rosenbloom, supra note 28, at 307 n.9.
53. Id. at 352; see, e.g., Talbot, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39576, at *36. 
54. See Rosenbloom, supra note 28, at 339.
55. Id. at 322.
exceed the Supreme Court’s minimum requirements for “ade-
quate” prison law libraries.41 Indeed, the collections of New
York State’s prison law libraries appear to exceed even the
requirements set forth by the American Association of Law
Libraries’ Special Committee on Law Library Services to
Prisoners.42 Furthermore, New York State is one of the few
states that has four non-prison libraries that provide legal
materials to prisoners.43 In this regard, New York State pris-
oners appear to have greater legal resources at their disposal
than do the prisoners in other states.  
Third, the New York State DOCS appears to formally edu-
cate more of its inmates in the law each year than do the cor-
rectional departments of other states.  Specifically, “[b]etween
350 and 400 [New York State] inmates earn legal research cer-
tificates each year.”44 Again, these efforts seem in contrast to
the efforts of other states (such as Arizona, Pennsylvania, and
Washington), which appear to be cutting the funding of such
vocational-education programs.45 Clearly, the New York State
inmates receiving this legal training are better equipped, and
perhaps more inclined, to file suit.46 In addition, many of the
New York State inmates receiving this training provide legal
guidance to other New York State inmates.  For example, New
York State’s prison law libraries are staffed, in part, by certified
inmate law clerks, who assist inmates in preparing their own
legal papers.47
Fourth, federal district courts located in New York State
make a concerted effort to help pro se prisoner litigants, with-
out, of course, providing substantive legal advice to them.48
For example, both the Northern District of New York and the
Western District of New York provide rather lengthy self-help
manuals to pro se litigants free of charge,49 while the Eastern
District of New York provides a number of shorter instruc-
tional materials for pro se litigants, also free of charge.50 In
addition, the Eastern District of New York has created an addi-
tional magistrate judge’s position specifically to improve “the
decisionmaking for pro se litigants” and to “direct greater
attention to those pro se cases involving potentially meritori-
ous claims.”51 Finally, the Southern District of New York has
what one former court staff attorney calls “one of the most pro-
gressive and largest pro se offices in the country” with “eight
attorneys and seven writ clerks.”52
Perhaps as a result of all these efforts, it appears that, over
the past decade, the experience of pro se prisoner litigants in
the Second Circuit has generally increased.  For example, a
recent study conducted of pro se cases in the Southern District
of New York during the second half of the 1990s revealed that,
during that time period, the number of “repeat filers” of pro se
prisoner cases rebounded in 1999 following a temporary drop
after the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act in
1996, which placed certain restrictions on such filings.53
Moreover, the success rate of prisoner civil-rights actions
appears to have increased somewhat.54
Also appearing to increase is the complexity of pro se pris-
oner complaints.  For example, in the Southern District of New
York, pro se prisoner civil-rights complaints that named multi-
ple defendants increased in complexity in the sense that they
named more defendants per complaint over the course of the
latter half of the 1990s.55 It is noteworthy that an increase in
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actions).
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sophistication of pro se New York State prisoner litigants, and
a willingness on the part of federal district courts located in
New York State to help pro se litigants, would largely explain
why, between 2000 and 2005, the Second Circuit was last (of
the 12 circuits, including the D.C. Circuit) in terms of the
median time to disposition for prisoner civil-rights cases (9.8
months as compared to a national average of 5.7 months).56
For example, one would expect sophisticated pro se prisoner
litigants to be more aware that extensions of time are available
and more likely to ask for extensions of time in which to
respond to dispositive motions filed by defendants; and one
would expect district courts determined to help pro se litigants
to be more likely to routinely grant such requests (thus, delay-
ing the ultimate resolution of the cases).
In sum, while the reason for the trend’s occurrence in the
Third Circuit appears partly to be the result of district courts’
frustration with abusive pro se litigants complaining about
lending practices in Philadelphia over the past decade, the
reason for the trend’s occurrence in the Second Circuit
appears to be an increase in the skill of pro se inmate litigants
due to an effort to educate them by the New York State DOCS
and the federal district courts located in New York State.
However, more enlightening than the reason for the trend’s
appearance is an analysis of the rationales for the revocation
of special status.  
III. RATIONALES FOR TREND
Generally, courts have articulated two distinct rationales for
their revocation of the special status of overly litigious pro se
litigants.  The first rationale is that the pro se litigant’s exces-
sive litigiousness demonstrates his experience, the lack of
which is the reason for conferring the special status upon the
pro se litigant.57 The second rationale is that the pro se liti-
gant’s excessive litigiousness is tainted with abuse (e.g., frivo-
lousness or vexatiousness), warranting sanctions to curb
future abuses.58
Courts relying on the “experience” rationale look at a vari-
ety of factors in assessing whether or not the pro se litigant is
experienced.  Most often, these factors include (1) the number
of previous federal or state court actions or appeals filed, and
(2) the recency or simultaneity of the actions or appeals.59
Courts relying on the “abusiveness” rationale also look at a
variety of factors in assessing whether a pro se litigant has
abused the legal system.  Most often, these factors include (1)
whether the litigant’s previous actions, appeals and/or motions
were dismissed or denied, and, if so, whether they were so
wholly without merit as to indicate an intent to annoy or
harass,60 (2) whether the previous actions were related to the
subject matter of the current proceeding so as to indicate an
intent to litigate issues already decided,61 and (3) whether the
litigant has violated a rule of civil procedure or court rule,
especially after having been repeatedly advised of the rule so as
to indicate willful disobedience.62 Slightly more important
than the number of previous abuses appears to be the magni-
tude or severity of those abuses.63 In this regard, the rationale
contains a distinct punitive element, unlike the “experience”
rationale.64 For example, the “experience” rationale would
likely consider a previous dismissal or a violation of a proce-
dural rule as a sign of inexperience, militating against the revo-
cation of the pro se litigant’s special status.65
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abusive pro se litigant’s ability to further proceed pro se has been
construed, by some courts, as protecting the First Amendment
rights of other litigants.  See, e.g., Hamilton, 945 So.2d at 1122-
1123.
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Opponents of an overly litigious pro se litigant would also proba-
bly argue that the Second Circuit’s characterization, in 2005, of
the denial of special status to an overly litigious pro se litigant as
an imposition of a “heightened pleading standard” was dictum,
and simply an unfortunate choice of words.  See Chavis, 128 F.
App’x at 803 & n.3.
Generally, courts in the Second Circuit have applied the
“experience” rationale, while courts in the Third Circuit have
applied the “abusiveness” rationale, although there have been
some exceptions.66 Perhaps the most interesting (and instruc-
tive) such exception occurred in the winter of 2000 in the
Eastern District Pennsylvania.  There, U.S. District Judge
Herbert J. Hutton faced a litigious pro se plaintiff named
Stephen Frempong-Atuahene, who had previously filed a
dozen lawsuits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.67 In
two decisions, Judge Hutton revoked Frempong-Atuahene’s
special status on the ground that, because Frempong-Atuahene
was an experienced litigant, he was not in need of special sta-
tus.68 However, by February, Judge Hutton’s patience had
apparently worn thin; continuing to revoke Frempong-
Atuahene’s special status, he based that revocation on the
ground that Frempong-Atuahene should be punished for abus-
ing the judicial system.69 Perhaps this is the inevitable pro-
gression of a court’s experience of a particularly litigious pro se
litigant—liberal leniency, followed by strained patience, fol-
lowed by downright frustration.
IV. FAIRNESS OF TREND
Is this revocation of special status fair?  A litigious pro se lit-
igant might advance a number of arguments in support of his
position that the revocation is unfair.  First, he might argue
that he has a constitutional right (e.g., under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) to use the courts with or
without counsel, that he needs to exercise that right in order to
remedy certain injustices (e.g., errors in the criminal justice
system, abuses in the nation’s overcrowded prisons, etc.), and
that the revocation of his special status constitutes retaliation
for exercising that right.70 Second, he might argue that,
through the denial of a lenient reading of his pleadings, he is
being subjected to a “heightened pleading standard,”71 which
runs afoul of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Supreme Court’s prohibition of heightened pleading stan-
dards.72 Third, he might argue that any abusive conduct by pro
se litigants is already being remedied by various statutes that
inhibit abusive conduct by pro se litigants (e.g., vexatious liti-
gation statutes such as those in California, Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, and Texas).73
The opponents of an overly litigious pro se litigant would,
no doubt, have some rather predictable responses to these
arguments.  With respect to the First Amendment argument,
they would probably argue that (1) requiring pro se litigants to
present their claims in compliance with the same rules
imposed on represented litigants does not deny the pro se liti-
gants access to the courts, (2) the constitutional right of access
to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional (e.g., there
is no constitutional right to abuse the litigation process),74 and
(3) the causation element of a retaliation claim is missing
under the circumstances (since it is not the exercise of the pro
se litigant’s constitutional right that has caused the court to
revoke his special status but the fact that the pro se litigant is
experienced or abusive).  With respect to the “heightened
pleading standard” argument, opponents of an overly litigious
pro se litigant would probably argue that, when the special sta-
tus of an overly litigious pro se litigant is revoked, the litigant
is not being subjected to a “heightened pleading standard” but
to an ordinary pleading standard (i.e., instead of the lowered
pleading standard ordinarily conferred to pro se litigants due
to their usual inexperience).75 With respect to the argument
that abusive conduct by pro se litigants is being remedied by
reliance on various statutes that prohibit abusive conduct by
pro se litigants, opponents of an overly litigious pro se litigant
would probably argue that, in part because such statutes are so
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limited in scope, they often do not apply;76 furthermore, even
when they do apply, they do not always stop “repeat filers”
from continuing to file complaints.77
In addition, opponents of an overly litigious pro se litigant
would probably argue that, by infusing missing claims and
arguments into the papers of the overly litigious pro se liti-
gant, courts are unfairly tipping the scales of justice against
the pro se litigant’s opponents and in favor of the pro se liti-
gant, who is in fact either experienced or abusive.78 For
example, such opponents might point out that, with increas-
ing frequency, the papers of “pro se” litigants are in fact being
“ghostwritten” by attorneys.79 As a result, they might
observe, as did one district court, that the result is that
“[undisclosed ghostwriting] necessarily causes the court to
apply the wrong tests in its decisional process . . . .  The entire
process [is] skewed to the distinct disadvantage of the non-
offending party.”80 In addition, opponents of an overly liti-
gious pro se litigant might point out that a pro se prisoner 
litigant “may possess several distinct advantages over the ordi-
nary litigant: time to draft multiple and prolonged pleadings;
ability to proceed in forma pauperis and thus escape any finan-
cial obstacles confronting the usual litigant; and availability of
free materials which the state must provide the prisoner,
including paper and postage.”81 They might also argue that
civilian pro se litigants are increasingly helped by online self-
representation resources,82 and that all pro se litigants are
increasingly helped by legal self-help books.83 Indeed, they
might argue that the end result of all of these advantages is
that, often, the papers prepared by an experienced pro se liti-
gant are in many ways comparable to the papers prepared by
either inexperienced or time-pressed attorneys representing
the pro se litigant’s opponents.84
Similarly, all of the courts’ represented litigants might argue
that any conferral of special status to overly litigious pro se 
litigants is unfair since it causes the resolution of their cases to
be delayed months, perhaps years, as judges (and their law
clerks) struggle with the papers of overly litigious pro se liti-
gants in order to imagine every conceivable claim and argu-
ment they could have raised, stretching the courts’ limited
resources.  This burden on the courts has been well docu-
mented, both anecdotally (e.g., through comments by judges
in decisions)85 and more formally (e.g., through surveys and
studies).86 The courts’ represented litigants might also point
out that, almost always, the represented litigants have paid the
courts’ costly filing fees,87 while, almost always, the overly liti-
gious pro se litigants have not paid those fees, having been
Court Review 19
88. See Rosenbloom, supra note 28, at 324-325.
89. See, e.g., Iwachiw, 396 F.3d at 529; Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261;
Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990); Procup,
792 F.2d at 1074; City of Buffalo, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6070, at
*16.
90. Antonelli v. Burnham, 582 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 n.4 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
91. Among these sanctions may be the following: (1) refusing to
extend a procedural deadline (if the litigant’s abuses have to do
with procedural delays); (2) treating designated facts as estab-
lished for purposes of the action, refusing to allow the litigant to
support or oppose designated claims, prohibiting the litigant from
introducing designated matters in evidence, or drawing an infer-
ence adverse to the litigant (if the litigant’s abuses have to do with
the discovery process); and (3) striking part of the litigant’s
motion papers or opposition papers (if the litigant’s abuses have
to do with the filing of frivolous or improper motion papers or
opposition papers).  
92. See, e.g., Eggersdorf, 8 F. App’x at 143 (denying leniency to pro se
inmate who had 12 simultaneously pending lawsuits in N.D.N.Y.);
Gummerson, 201 F.3d at *2 (denying leniency to pro se inmate
who had 12 simultaneously pending lawsuits in N.D.N.Y.);
Talbot, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39576, at *18-20 & n.10 (denying
leniency to pro se inmate who had filed 20 lawsuits in N.D.N.Y.);
Riddick, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5394, at *7 & n.3 (denying
leniency to pro se inmate who had filed 20 lawsuits in N.D.N.Y.).  
93. See, e.g., Santiago, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 670 (denying leniency to pro
se inmate who had 10 lawsuits pending in S.D.N.Y.); Saunders,
2006 WL 3051792, at *2 & n.11 (denying leniency to pro se
inmate who had previously filed eight federal court actions or
appeals); McClellan, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8164, at *3-4 & n.3
(denying leniency to pro se inmate who had filed seven previous
lawsuits against prison officials); Brown, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
213, at *2 n.1 (denying leniency to pro se inmate who had seven
lawsuits pending in W.D.N.Y.).
94. See, e.g., McEachin v. Faruki, 03-CV-1442, 2006 WL 721570, at *2
n.3 (N.D.N.Y. March 20, 2006) (refusing to deny leniency to pro
se inmate who had filed 11 other federal lawsuits since 2000);
Pritchett v. Portoundo, 03-CV-0378, 2005 WL 2179398, at *2 n.3
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2005) (refusing to deny leniency to pro se
inmate who had filed eight other federal lawsuits since 1996);
Burke v. Seitz, 01-CV-1396, 2006 WL 383513, at *2 n.5 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 13, 2006) (refusing to deny leniency to pro se inmate who
had filed six other federal lawsuits in previous nine years); Ariola
v. Onondaga County Sher. Dep’t, 04-CV-1262, 2007 WL 119453,
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2007) (refusing to deny leniency to pro se
inmate who had previously filed five actions or appeals in federal
or state court); Smith, 2006 WL 2805242, at *3 & n.4 (refusing to
deny leniency to pro se inmate who had filed five other lawsuits);
Loren v. Feerick, 97-CV-3975, 1997 WL 441939, at *1 & n.9
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1997) (continuing to afford special status to pro
se litigant who had filed five previous actions in state or federal
court regarding current matter); Abbas v. Senkowski, 03-CV-0476,
2005 WL 2179426, at *2 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2005) (continu-
ing to afford special status to pro se inmate who had filed three
other federal actions since 1997).
95. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 116.230 (2006). 
granted in forma pauperis status.88 Thus, the courts’ repre-
sented litigants would probably argue that, in terms of time
and money, the courts’ “paying customers” are shouldering
much of the cost imposed by pro se litigation.89
For these reasons, it appears that, based on a balancing of
the equities, the revocation of special status in the case of
overly litigious pro se litigants is generally fair.  As one federal
district court judge noted more than 20 years ago, “[T]here
must come a point at which the solicitude owed the justice
system must (like a supply-demand curve) rise to, intersect
and surpass the obligation owed a persistent litigant such as
[plaintiff].”90
V. PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR COURTS AND
PRACTITIONERS
When courts and practitioners are considering whether the
special status of a particularly litigious pro se litigant should be
revoked, they might want to keep four points in mind.  First,
because the “experience” rationale is remedial in nature and
not punitive, it is generally a more narrowly tailored solution
to the problems posed by a pro se litigant’s litigiousness than is
the “abusiveness” rationale.  Again, when relying on the “expe-
rience” rationale, courts are simply taking away a court-con-
ferred litigation advantage after finding that the advantage is
no longer necessary.  Conversely, when relying on the “abu-
siveness” rationale, courts are punishing an overly litigious pro
se litigant in a way that is often not directly related to the rea-
son for the punishment.  There are a number of sanctions that
may be more directly related to an abusive litigant’s particular
abuses than is the revocation of his special status.91
Furthermore, courts’ application of the “abusiveness” rationale
often ignores the fact that the pro se litigant remains (despite
his abusiveness) in need of special treatment because of his
inexperience.  As a result, it appears that, generally, using an
“experience” rationale is preferable to using an “abusiveness”
rationale, when a choice exists between the two.  (A conceiv-
able example of when such a choice might not exist is when a
pro se litigant has filed dozens of frivolous actions in a court,
necessitating an order barring him from again proceeding pro
se in that court without prior leave of the court.)   
Second, there is, of course, no formula for determining
“How many cases is too many?”  However, it appears that, gen-
erally, the magic number is about a dozen.92 Granted, there are
some cases revoking the special status of a pro se litigant who
has filed fewer than a dozen cases.93 However, there appear to
be more cases refusing to revoke the special status of a pro se
litigant who has filed fewer than a dozen cases.94 Interestingly,
this de facto “rule of twelve” is consistent with the California
Code of Civil Procedure, which declines to extend a reduction
in small-claims-court filing fees to those litigants who have
filed more than 12 small-claims lawsuits in the state within the
previous 12 months.95
Third, when employing the “experience” rationale for
revoking special status, courts need not myopically view what
factors indicate whether a pro se litigant is “experienced.”  As
explained earlier, when assessing such experience, courts usu-
ally look at the number of federal and state court actions and
appeals the pro se litigant has previously filed, as well as the
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recency or simultaneity of the actions and appeals.96 However,
some courts also look at the pro se litigant’s effectiveness in lit-
igating the action(s) or appeal(s) in question.  Specifically,
these courts typically examine things such as (1) the quality of
pleadings (e.g., whether they are typed, crafted in accordance
with the relevant rules of civil procedure, etc.), (2) the cogency
of motion papers (e.g., whether they are supported by applica-
ble legal authorities, filed in accordance with court rules, etc.),
and (3) the ultimate success of any motions, actions or appeals
the litigant has previously filed (or the failure of any motions
previously opposed).97 Such a practice seems appropriate in
that it is consistent with the standard often used by courts to
decide whether to appoint counsel to a pro se litigant.98 Such
a practice seems appropriate also as a matter of common sense.
Is there a better indicator of experience than skill?
Finally, when applying the “experience” rationale, courts
need not treat special status as an “all or nothing” benefit.
Courts may confer special status to a pro se litigant on a “slid-
ing scale,” treating the litigant more leniently than other rep-
resented litigants but not as leniently as inexperienced pro se
litigants.99 Similarly, courts may limit the conferral of the 
benefit, or the denial of the benefit, to the particular motion or
stage of the proceeding in question.  Doing this would help
mitigate any deleterious effect of mistakenly concluding that a
pro se litigant is experienced when in fact he has simply been
helped by a ghostwriter on a particular occasion.100
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the reasons for the trend’s occurrence in the Third
Circuit appears to be district courts’ frustration with a handful
of particularly abusive pro se litigants complaining about lend-
ing practices in the Philadelphia area in the past decade, while
the main reason the trend’s occurrence in the Second Circuit
appears to be an increase in the skill of pro se inmate litigants
due an effort to educate them by the prison system and federal
district courts in New York State.  This difference in these rea-
sons for the trend mirrors the difference in the underlying
rationales for the trend: (1) that the pro se litigant’s excessive
litigiousness is tainted with abuse, warranting sanctions to
curb future abuses; and (2) that the pro se litigant’s excessive
litigiousness demonstrates his experience, the lack of which is
the reason for conferring special status onto him.  Regardless
of which rationale is used, the practice is generally fair.
However, courts and practitioners might want to keep four
points in mind when wrestling with the issue of whether the
special status of an overly litigious pro se litigant should be
revoked.  
First, the “experience” rationale for the revocation of spe-
cial status appears to be a more narrowly tailored solution to
the problems posed by a pro se litigant’s excessive litigiousness
than does the “abusiveness” rationale.  Second, while there is
no formula for determining “How many cases is too many?”
generally the magic number appears to be about 12.  Third,
when using the “experience” rationale for revoking a pro se 
litigant’s special status, courts should not look simply at the
number of actions and appeals the pro se litigant has previ-
ously filed, and the recency or simultaneity of those actions
and appeals; courts should look also at the pro se litigant’s
effectiveness in previously litigating the actions and appeals.
Finally, when applying the “experience” rationale, courts
should not fall into the trap of believing that special status is
an “all or nothing” benefit: rather, it may be conferred on a
“sliding scale,” and it may be revoked for a discrete phase of
the litigation.  By keeping these points in mind, courts may
more easily balance the need of pro se litigants to special treat-
ment against the right of represented litigants to a playing field
that is level and justice that is swift. 
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